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INTRODUCTION 
The proposal for a Global System of Trade Preferences among developing 
countries (henceforth GSTP) is the most ambitious attempt to create a 
preferential trading system among developing countries as of now. 
Through the implementation of preferential margins in the system of protection 
against imports in the participating countries, this preferential system aims at 
the stimulation of trade among developing countries and at supporting the 
collective self reliance of this group of countries. An initial effort to 
implement such a preferential trading system has been undertaken under the 
auspices of GATT since 1971. Ho we ver, since 1976 a new effort has been 
initiated by the Group of 77. The implementation of a preferential system was 
seen by developing countries as part of a much wider scheme of activities to 
stimulate their economie co-operation. 
However, after more than ten years of preparations and negotiations within 
UNCTAD, the plan still is in its embroynatic stage and far from effective. For 
that reason it is not possible to make a realistic assessment of the viability of 
this proposal and of the possible impact that the implementation of such a 
system may have on the participating countries as well as on other countries. 
In fact, it is not even clear at this stage what the nature and extent of the 
concessions will be. The experience with many integration schemes implemented 
in groups of developing and developed countries shows that almost invariably a 
series of specific bottlenecks occurs during the initial stages of such schemes, 
and that specific conditions have to be met to enable a successful operation of 
a trade preferential system. It seems all too likely that the ambitious proposal 
for a GSTP, that includes countries that have only limited economie relations 
among each other in the pre-integration stage, and that differ widely in 
economie structure and government performance will end up as a non-entity if 
insufficiënt notice is taken of such potential bottlenecks. 
This paper attempts to shed light on the possibility to further the process of 
integration and liberalization in developing countries, particularly through the 
establishment of a preferential trading system. We review different models of 
economie integration and their objectives, and particular emphasis is given to 
bottlenecks that may frustrate the efficiënt operation of a preferential trading 
system. 
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2. MODELS OF INTEGRATION 
In its broadest sense economie integration of countries can be conceived as 
the removal of discrimination between the economie agents in the participating 
countries and the co-ordination of economie policies.* 
The broadest division between models of integration is between the negative 
and the positive approach to integration. Characteristic of the negative 
approach to integration is the liberalization of markets by the group-wise 
reduction of national rule systems. The liberalization approach aims particularly 
at the removal of instruments that discriminate between domestically produced 
goods and services and those produced in partner countries, and on the 
abolishment of restrictions on the free movement of factors of production. In 
the extreme case of fully integrated economies the law of one price holds for 
all tradables, and factors of production that are perfectly mobile and 
substitutable will have equal levels of marginal productivity and remuneration. 
Positive integration - the dirigiste approach - aims at modifying the prevalent 
trade and industrialization regimes by creating a new rule system according to 
which intervention in marfcet forces takes place. Such a rule system may be 
implemented to correct the distributional effects of trade liberalization so as 
to obtain an equitable distribution of gains and losses among the countries 
participating in the integration scheme. These corrections may be brought 
about through compensatory fiscal measures, the operation of regional 
development banks, or an agency to allocate industrial activity among the 
partner countries. Alternatively, the purpose of a rule system may be more 
comprehensive when integration is to be brought about through sectoral and 
regional planning, investment co-ordination and the regulation of foreign 
investment. Such models of integration aim at a programmed and joined 
selection of novel activities. 
Focusing now on the liberalization of economie activity and the reduction of 
discrimination in a group of countries in a co-ordinated fashion, several stages 
can be distinguished as regards the extent to which preferences are granted 
and policies are co-ordinated. In each subsequent stage of integration national 
governments cede part of their autonomy to shape the trade and 
industrialization regime.1 In a free-trade area intra-area obstacles to trade such 
as tariff and non-tariff barriers are removed but governments can pursue an 
independent trade policy vis-a-vis third countries provided such policies donot 
inflict with regulations to avoid deflection. No additional harmonization of 
4 
economie policies is required and there is consequently hardly any need of an 
intergovernmental agency to harmonize policy. In a customs union trade 
policies of the member countries vis-a-vis the rest of the world are 
harmonized by means of common external tariff and non-tariff barriers in 
addition to the intra-regional removal of trade barriers. In a common market 
not only the movement of goods is liberalized as in a customs union but also 
obstacles to the movement of factors of production are removed. In an 
economie union a more fully regional substitution for domestic policies is 
obtained through the unification of exchange-rate policy, monetary and fiscal 
stabilization policies and the provision of union-wide public goods. 
Integration through the liberalization of markets rather than through projects 
or sectoral planning has been the avenue most frequently pursued by 
developing countries as well as developed countries. Many of such liberalization 
attempts have failed to contribute significantly to the stated objectives of the 
integration schemes. Most of such preferential systems have not fully 
developed into f ree-trade areas or customs unions but stagnated as limited 
preferential arrangements. 
3. OBJECTIVES OF LIBERALIZATION AND INTEGRATION 
3.1 Effects of liberalization. 
We study the objectives of a preferential trading system by considering it, 
first of all, a particular model of trade liberalization. Therefore we start by 
reviewing the objectives of liberalization as such and proceed by discussing 
more particularly the objectives of a preferential trading system. Whenever 
reference is made in this study to trade liberalization the term is used in its 
traditional meaning i.e. the reduction of tariffs or non-tariff barriers. In some 
studies, however, liberalization refers to the substitution of price measures 
such as import tariffs for administrative import controls such as quota. A 
distinction may be made between the static and dynamic effects of trade 
liberalization on welfare and economie growth. The traditional, static gains 
from trade consist of gains due to a shift in trade and consumption and a 
shift in the allocation of factors of production. These are the so-called once-
and-for-all welfare effects of trade liberalization. 
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In the modern literature on liberalization and welfare much attention is paid to 
the effect of the abolishment of quantitative controls on rent-seeking. The 
allocation of resources for rent-seeking activities may be considered a loss to 
society as resources are withdrawn from productive activities, i.e. the 
production of goods and services. Two types of directly unproductive activities 
may be distinguished : lobbying for specific (trade) policies and rent-seeking 
once imports are controlled by licenses. Lobby activities take place when 
government is not exclusively guided by the objective of maximizing welfare 
for society at large but is sensitive to the claims of pressure groups. In such 
cases, the visible hand of government that manipulates the market, is 
manipulated itself. Costs of rent-seeking activities vary according to the way 
import licenses are distributed. As indicated by Krueger, import licenses for 
intermediate goods may be allocated in proportion to production capacity, and 
this may warrant the creation of excess capacity up to the point where the 
rate of return on import licenses is equal to the rate of return on alternative 
investments. The creation of excess capacity for the sake of obtaining import 
licenses is a directly unproductive activity. Also, import licenses for consumer 
goods may be allocated in proportion to the application for those licenses from 
importers-wholesalers. This induces firms to invest in trading activities 
resulting in a situation in which imports are handled by a large number of 
firms that are operating at sub-optimal costs levels. Again, the investment 
made for the sake of obtaining licenses is a directly unproductive way of 
allocating resources. Alternatively, licenses are distributed on the discretion of 
officials, and the costs to be made in order to influence their decision and 
increase the change of receiving an import license is again a directly 
unproductive allocation of resources.^ These costs of directly unproductive 
rent-seeking activities should be incorporated into the analyses of the effects 
of liberalization on welfare. By definition it holds that withdrawing available 
resources from the process of production results in a less than maximal level 
of production. In such cases society is not on the production possibility curve 
but within its boundaries. Srinivasan has even suggested that in a situation in 
which directly unproductive activities prevail to shape import restricting 
policies, the level of domestic import-competing production may be lower than 
in the free-trade equilibrium position or a situation in which trade policy is 
designed costlessly. 
The point made here is illustrated in Figure 1 with production possibility curve 
QQ* and a set of community indifference curves. At prevailing world market 
prices and with all domestic resources allocated in directly productive activities 
production is at P* and consumption at C*. 
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Figure 1. The gains from trade 
Exportable 
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Suppose that the domestic price ratio differs from the international price ratio 
due to a tariff or non-tariff banier. In case producers wouldnot have 
allocated resources to Jobby for protection, domestic production would be at P 
and consumption at C. If, however, resources would have been allocated to 
lobby for protection or to appropriate import licenses, production would be at 
- a point within_ the boundaries of the production function, at P, and 
consumption at S. Opening the economy and abandoning a policy of protection 
induced by lobby groups would release resources to increase welfare, the effect 
of which would come on top of the traditional static gains from trade. 
Apart from the aforementioned static effects of liberalization we may 
distinguish dynamic effects. These effects, however, cannot be derived in a 
straightforward fashion from neoclassical production theory. In the literature 
different views have been developed on these effects. For analytical purposes 
we shall distinguish here dynamic effects of export expansion and import 
penetration. First, export expansion removes the limits to the volume of 
production set by the size of the domestic market and allows for the fuller 
development of specialization in production. This may result in the 
exploitation of economies of scale that are internal to the export sector. 
Second, production for competitive world markets may give incentives for 
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technological improvements and product development, and may stimulate 
efficiency in production. To the extent that technological knowledge and newly 
developed skills of marketing and design spread from the export sector to 
other sectors of the economy, there are positive external economies to be 
reaped as well. Such knowledge and skills, once they are used as inputs in 
other sectors, result in a more general increase of efficiency and factor 
productivity. In case such knowledge and skills become available to the rest of 
the economy for free, i.e. as a public good, there is an argument to stimulate 
the export sector through subsidies. 
The effects related to increased international competition may also occur in 
the liberalized import-competing sector. Summarizing, the economie objective of 
liberalization, and ipso facto of a preferential trading area, is to reap gains 
from trade. These gains may be brought about through (1) increased efficiency 
due to specialization according to comparative advantage; (2) increased welfare 
due to the release of factors of production, previously used in directly 
unproductive activities; (3) exploitation of economies of scale in the expanding 
export sector; (4) increased efficiency due to international competition in the 
export sector and import-competing sector with possible spread effects 
throughout the rest of economy. 
It should be noted that not all effects mentioned here necessarily take place 
simultaneously. On the contrary, it is highly questionable that these 
arguments for liberalization are additive or reinforcing." Exploitation of 
economies of scale by the most efficiënt firms may reduce instead of increase 
competition. Also, liberalization may lead to a concentration of production in 
firms that are not at the lowest costs curve but produce at lower costs than 
more efficiënt firms in countries with smaller markets, due to their larger 
production volume in the pre-liberalization period. This then would be a 
perverse effect of liberalization.' 
3.2 Objectives of a preferential trading system. 
If the sole purpose of a government were to reap gains from trade as 
discussed earlier, there would be no rationale to bring about the 
transformation from a protectionist towards a free-trade regime in a way that 
discriminates among trading partners. While liberalization creates new trade 
flows among the partners of the preferential trading system, discrimination 
may divert flows from the more efficiënt supplier outside the preferential area 
toward a less efficiënt trading partner who is member of the preferential 
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system. The loss of welfare due to this trade diversion effect could have been 
avoided by liberalizing the trade regime in a non-discriminatory fashion. Thus, 
there must be a rationale for the creation of a preferential trading system 
beyond the mere objective of a group of governments to liberalize the trade 
regime since they could have done so without discriminating non-member 
countries. 
Economie schemes of integration are proposed an implemented to serve a mix 
of political and economie objectives, and a comprehensive analysis of 
integration requires an assessment of the political and economie costs an 
benefits of integration. Even if the objectives of integration are merely 
political by nature the economie consequences of such a regime transformation 
should be assessed. It has frequently been claimed that the objectives of 
integration among developing countries differ from those among developed 
countries and that consequently the impact of integration should be assessed in 
a different way. Axline, for instance, claims that integration in developed 
countries aims at the static benefits of liberalization while in developing 
countries emphasis is on the dynamic growth effects." For that reason, an 
assessment of integration among developing countries focusing merely on trade 
creation and diversion effects falls short and is inappropriate. A similar 
position is taken by Robson, Vaitsos, Pefiaherrera, Cooper and Massell, and 
others.9 The static gains take place in the short term whereas the dynamic 
effects are bound to take place in the longer term. Although there is no 
adequate procedure to relate directly changes in the economie performance in 
the course of time to integration, it is generally assumed that the longer-term 
effects are of greater significance than the short-term effects. 
When discussing the objectives of integration it should be kept in mind that 
the frustrating experience with many an integration effort is caused by 
differences between partner countries in the intensity and hierarchy of 
motivations for integration and their different capacities to realize similar 
objectives. Basically, two distinct approaches may be distinguished as regards 
the rationale of preferential trading systems. In the first approach, integration 
is conceived as a fundamental change in economie policy in the partner 
countries. In this approach it is assumed that the existing trade and 
industrialization regime that centres around the application of tariff and non-
tariff barriers to imports has to be altered since it does not allow society to 
gain maximum welfare. The existing regime, therefore, is considered inferior to 
a regime, to be implemented, that allows for a pattern of specialization that 
is more in line with comparative advantage. The effectiveness of the 
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integration effort is then assessed by comparing its trade creation and 
diversion effects. Analyses along this line fail to explain why a country opts 
for discriminatory liberalization instead of non-discriminatory liberalization. 
Trade diversion appears to be the costs of an irrational policy. 
The alternative approach assumes that the existing trade and industrialization 
regime is a rational regime, tariffs being rational instruments that are applied 
for economie and non-economic reasons. By focusing on the economie 
objectives of the existing trade and industrialization regime, and the limited 
options to serve these objectives through the application of alternative 
instruments, the rationale of integration is seen from an entirely different 
perspective and the valuation of trade creation and diversion effects is entirely 
distinct. In this approach there is no change in the economie objective of 
government policy before and after the creation of the preferential trading 
system. The main objective is promotion of manufacturing industry.*" This 
approach will be dealt with in two successive steps. First we shall deal briefly 
with the rationale of government intervention in the trade regime to stimulate 
manufacturing industry. Next step will be to diseuss the rationale of 
establishing a preferential trading system. 
3.2.1 The rationale of government intervention in the trade regime. 
There may be good reasons for government to intervene in markets in the 
presence of domestic distortions i.e. in situations where prices deviate from 
opportunity costs. However, as Johnson has indicated, such situations do not 
necessarily warrant government intervention in the trade regime and 
proteetionist measures may further reduce economie welfare because of the 
distorting impact of this type of instrument.11 Stimulation of infant industries 
is the main classical exception to the superiority of free trade. The other 
exception, the optimal tariff, need not be discussed in the context of this 
study. Although the 'infant industry' argument has been applied widely as a 
rationale for tariff protection - and provides the basis for the exceptional 
position granted to developing countries in the GATT rules - it is often used 
in a somewhat loose and inaccurate way. Without going into details of this 
classical argument some remarks are in place regarding its validity and 
application. To arrive at a sound argument for protection, the infant industry 
should create a positive external effect that accrues to society as a free good. 
In such a case the social rate of return on the investment in industry exceeds 
the private rate of return. Production may then be stimulated from the level 
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which is optimal from the level which is optimal from the private investor's 
point of view to the level which is optimal from the point of view of society. 
The widest application possible of this argument is formulated by Corden and 
also by Keesing when they refer to atmosphere-creation. As formulated by 
Corden: "This atmosphere-creating effect may well provide a strong basis-
possibly the strongest of all - for an 'infant economy' argument for 
generalized protection of manufacturing ..." in developing countr ies^ The key 
of the argument for infant-industry stimulation relates to technological 
externalities. There is a case for infant-industry stimulation when an 
investment in a process of knowledge acquisition is socially more profitably 
than privately because the private investor cannot appropriate the whole of 
the social return from the investment. * Johnson and Baldwin have scrutinized 
the case of infant-industry stimulation and have concluded that for many types 
of knowledge acquisition the problem of externalities doesnot exist.1 ' 
However, when such conditions do occur the divergence between private and 
social benefits of knowledge creation may be substantial.'" The same point is 
stressed by Westphal: the effects of technological mastery by a firm spread 
through society and enhance its technological basis.*' In such circumstances 
government intervention is warranted to obtain an optimal allocation of 
investment and level of production. 
The infant-industry argument as defined above pro vides a rationale for 
government intervention, not necessarily for government intervention in the 
trade regime through tariff and non-tariff barriers. The latter type of 
intervention is only superior to intervention through subsidization in case the 
collection and distribution costs of tariffs are lower than those of subsidies 
which may typically be the case in developing countries, as pointed out by 
Corden.18 
Apart from the economie arguments for government intervention there are 
non-economic arguments that are probably of greater relevance for 
understanding the role of government in the real world. In the case of 
economie arguments, government intervention is warranted to maximize the 
level of welfare, i.e. real product, measured in terms of goods and services for 
individual consumption. In the case of non-economic arguments, government 
intervention is required to maximize "utility" as derived from the consumption 
of private and public goods and services. The non-economic objectives of 
economie policy may be added to the economie objectives in the social utility 
function or be treated as additional constraints.1^ Fulfilling the non-economic 
objectives contributes to the overall level of welfare, measured in terms of 
utility, be it at the expense of the volume of privately appropriable goods and 
services. 
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Bhagwati and Srinivasan distinguish four types of non-economic objectives of 
government policy. the production of a good should not fall below a certain 
level; the consumption of a good should not exceed a certain level; the import 
or export of a good should not exceed a certain level; the level of factor use 
in a good should exceed a certain level.2^ 
Following Bhagwati and Srinivasan we discuss the case of society's non-
economic objective to raise the level of industrial production above the free-
trade level. As illustrated in Figure 2, in the absence of government 
intervention the volume of industrial productions is Ql and society is at P on 
the production possibility curve QQ*. Consumption is at C. Assume the 
prefered level of industrial production is Q2. To raise industrial production an 
shift resources from the non-industrial sector to industry government could use 
production taxes and subsidies that would not affect the price ratio for 
consumers. Production shifts to P* and consumption to C*. In case the 
objective is realized by using a tariff on imports of industrial goods, 
consumption would shift to C, indicating a further loss of private consumption. 
Figure 2. Non-economic objectives of government intervention. 
Non-industrial 
good 
Industrial good 
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As indicated earlier, only in specific cases tariffs are first-best instruments to 
fulfil non-economic policy objectives. To stimulate industrial production or 
reduce consumption to the required level, taxes an subsidies are preferable 
over tariffs, provided that collection and distribution costs of the different 
systems of intervention are identical. However, to reduce dependence on 
foreign markets and stimulate self reliance, taxes on trade are first-best policy 
and superior to other taxes and subsidies. 
3.2.2 Preferential trading systems with industry as a public good. 
The essential point in the second approach of the rationale of a preferential 
trading system is that industry is seen as a public good. It is assumed that 
there is a collective preference for industry as such - not for particular 
industrial products - and that society is willing to accept a reduction of real 
income to obtain units of government intervention through tariffs or other 
instruments. The underlying reasons for stimulating industry may be manifold. 
In many countries, development has virtually been identified with 
industrialization. Industry has been seen as a motor of growth, spreading 
modernization through linkages with the rest of the economy and creating new 
employment opportunities. Society will allocate resources to expand production 
of the public good industry up to the point where the marginal utility per 
unit of resources spent on private goods equals that on the public good/* 
The rationale of the creation of a preferential trading system with industry as 
a public good is to reduce national real income foregone per unit of industry. 
By creating a preferential trading system and reallocating industrial activities 
among the partner countries according to efficiency criteria, all partner 
countries can obtain a higher level of real income, given the demanded level of 
industrial activity. Essentially, such a system shifts the supply curve of 
industry to the right as depicted in Figure 3. The demand curve DD* shows 
the decreasing marginal propensity of society to accept an additional reduction 
of real income to obtain an additional unit of industry. Supply curve SS1 
shows the increasing marginal costs attached to obtaining an additional unit of 
industry beyond Qj , which is the level of industry in case government does 
not intervene in market forces either through domestic taxes, subsidies or 
import barriers. The level of industrial activity Q2 may be obtained at reduced 
social costs in case industrial production is stimulated in the context of a 
preferential trading system. The shift of the industrial supply curve from SS1 
13 
to S*S1* is essentially caused by gains from trade that are reaped through the 
creation of a preferential trading system. Some division of labour based on 
comparative advantage, and some exploitation of economies of scale may have 
some positive welfare effects. 
Figure 3. Costs of expanding production of public good industry 
National real 
income foreqom 
Qi <& Industrial Droduction 
The division of industrial activities among the partner countries in the 
preferential trading system is at the heart of Cooper and Massell's theory of 
customs unions. Products may be distinguished by kind and country of origin. 
Each product in each country is produced at a different production function. 
This creates a hierarchy of industries in each of the partner countries in 
terms of real income foregone per unit of production. Depending on the shape 
of the supply curves of industrial products in the partner countries, a new 
hierarchy of industries for the market of the preferential trading area is 
created. An efficiënt kind of industrial development.- in terms of minimizing 
real income foregone - is obtained when the total level of industrial 
production is realized by having the lowest-cost product produced in the 
lowest-cost country. If production can be divided among partner countries 
without a reduction of the pre-integration-level of total industrial production 
in all partner countries, and the allocation of production is efficiënt i.e. 
minimizes real income foregone, integration is optimal and efficiënt. However, 
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such a division of labour among partner countries will not be feasible in all 
cases. In case an efficiënt allocation implies that the level of total industrial 
production is redistributed among partner countries in such a way that total 
industrial production in a country is below the level demanded (Q2), allocation 
is efficiënt, not optimal. An optimal division of industrial activity among 
partner countries - actual production is at the level demanded - may require a 
less than efficiënt pattern of product specialization since the selection of 
industries (products) is no longer based on the lowest-cost products in the 
overall preferential trading area. Countries then produce up to the level 
demanded according to the lowest cost curve of each country. Such an optimal 
distribution of production is quasi efficiënt. However, this quasi-efficient 
allocation of production may not be feasible when a country is no lowest-cost 
producer of any product within the preferential area. In that case the actual 
level of industrial production in the country concerned in the integration stage 
will be below the level demanded. 
The Cooper-Massell model assumes constant costs per unit of output in each 
industry. If allowance is made for economies of scale, the costs-reducing 
affect of a preferential trading system on the expansion of industrial 
production beyond the free-trade level may be even more significant. 
However, the possible occurrence of perverse specialization among partners 
might prevent the full exploitation of this costs-reducing effect as shown by 
Robson. ' 
The approach presented here departs from society's preference to stimulate 
industry beyond the level reached in the absence of government intervention, 
and the rationale of a preferential trading system is to reduce real income 
foregone per additional unit of industry. However, welfare theory suggests 
that given the non-economic objective of expanding industry, the application of 
tariffs and the creation of a preferential trading system is not a priori the 
most efficiënt way to realize this objective. As suggested earlier, a subsidy on 
industrial production is preferable over alternative instruments. Rather than 
creating a preferential trading system, (export) subsidies could be used to 
stimulate production and export. However, for a number of reasons the use of 
(export) subsidies may be problematic. Collection and distribution costs may be 
high as compared to a system of tariffs. A system of subsidization may be 
more difficult to control for trading partners and may lead to unfair 
competition among partner countries. Also, the use of export subsidies is 
restrained by GATT rules and challenged by trade partners. Only if 
alternative instruments such as (export)subsidies are not available or the costs 
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of their use are prohibitive would a preferential trading system be preferable. 
However, a system of collective protection with internal free trade is 
preferable over a trade policy of industrial protection in each partner country 
separately. 
3.2.3 Sources of demand for protection of industry. 
In the context of the previous analysis of the role of industry as a public 
good some remarks are in place regarding the sources of demand for 
government intervention in the trade regime to expand industrial production 
beyond the free-trade level. The traditional approach of trade policy in 
economie theory has been that government intervenes in the interest of society 
at large. Government is considered to be all wise and to apply instruments in a 
scientific fashion. It aims at maximizing social welfare and has perfect 
knowledge of the functioning of markets and instruments. This approach leads 
us to the position that government applies tariffs to stimulate industry to 
satisfy society's preferences for industry in a first-best way, given limitations 
in the application of alternative instruments. 
Essentially, this is also the approach foliowed by Cooper and Massell as well 
as Johnson in their theory of customs union formation in developing countries. 
Cooper and Massell's analysis is base on the assumption that there is a social 
preference for industry and that the electorate is willing to accept a reduction 
in income to achieve an increase in industrial production. Tariffs reflect this 
preference. Johnson starts from the same premise. Industry yields a flow of 
satisfaction to the electorate and the structure of tariff protection reflects 
society's preferences for specific industries. 
Alternatively, government may be seen as pursuing its-self-interest which may 
be regarded as an interest in survival. The political market may be seen as an 
market where competing interest groups operate to influence government so as 
to obtain rents, government being in a monopoly position in the formulation of 
policies and the application of instruments. In an undistorted democracy, 
government's survival is determined by voting. However, the political market 
may be imperfect like any other market, and other factors than group size may 
determine the impact of groups on government. If that were the case, 
protection reflects the capacity of industry to influence government and 
override the preferences of other groups, rather than the preferences of 
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society. Industry will allocate resources in lobbying for protection to the point 
where the marginal costs of lobbying equals the marginal benefits of an 
increase of protection.^" Since protection has sóme of the characteristics of a 
public good - all firms in a sector benefit from it irrespective of their 
contribution to the lobby for it - firms tend to reduce the private costs of 
lobbying. The possibilities for firms to take a free ride are particularly large 
when the protectionist measures are broad in scope, favouring many products 
and firms, while the opposite is true when these measures are highly specific. 
However, as Baldwin indicates, protection differs from a pure public good since 
the benefits that accrue from it depend on the price elasticity of supply of 
the f i rm.^ Sectors with only a limited number of firms, a few of which 
dominate production and employment, tend to be successful in lobbying for 
protection. Other factors that may increase the effectiveness of a lobby are 
the sector's economie and strategie importance, the size of its labour force, 
and the geographical concentration in a sensitive area. Finally, the lobbying 
sector may receive widespread support from different segments of society that 
donot have a direct interest in the specific case but have a high preference 
for a process of development undisturbed by external factors. When society is 
characterized by a conservative welfare function, widespread support for 
protection is based on solidarity cum self-interest, and society is willing to 
sacrifice private consumption to proleet itself against import competition. ° 
Our review of economie and non-economic factors underlying protection shows 
that in different countries protection may be the reflection of different 
preferences and differences in the capability of government to meet these 
preferences. Therefore, what is an "optimal tariff' - as refered to by Johnson, 
Cooper and Massell, and Feenstra and Bhagwati - differs according to the 
premises made with respect to society's preferences and capabilities. ° This has 
implications for the feasibility of liberalization and the creation of a 
preferential trading area, as will be discussed in the next section. 
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4 THE FEASIBILITY OF A PREFERENTIAL TRADING SYSTEM 
4.1 Introduction 
From here onwards the main focus shall be on obstacles to the formation of a 
preferential trading system and on adjustment problems that may occur in the 
process of creating such a system. Some of the obstacles and problems 
discussed here are more general by nature pertaining to the process of trade 
liberalization as such, but the emphasis will be on factors that obstruct 
particularly the creation of a trade preferential system among developing 
countries. While some of these obstacles are merely transitional, others are 
more persistent and have disrupted the entire process of integration through 
the formation of a free-trade area or customs union in the past. It should be 
clear that by shifting the focus from the theoretical argument in favour of 
trade liberalization towards the complexities that assert themselves in the 
actual formation of preferential trading systems, we donot intend to provide 
arguments for not undertaking an endeavour towards the liberalization of trade 
regimes. 
Before we disembark on a review of obstacles to the creation of preferential 
trading systems, some remarks are in place with respect to tariff and non-
tariff barriers and the effect of a change in these trade barriers on domestic 
prices. The trade and industrialization regime in many developing countries is 
characterized by an extensive use of tariffs and non-tariff barriers. The 
presumed effects of these instruments are that domestic demand for imports 
and import substitutes is reduced, domestic supply of import substitutes is 
stimulated, and consequently the self-sufficiency ratio is raised. The difference 
between domestic prices and world market prices brings about a reduction in 
consumer surplus and an increase in producer surplus and government income 
from taxes on trade. In general it holds that the less developed a country, the 
less developed its industrial infrastructure and the more industry needs 
stimulation. At the same time, government's dependence on taxes on trade 
trends to be high and the administrative infrastructure tends to be weak in 
countries and low levels of overall development. Consequently it is typical for 
less developed countries that tariff and non-tariff barriers create a price 
differential between domestic prices and world market prices and a bias against 
imports and exports. 
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As indicated earlier, liberalization is conceived here as a reduction of tariff 
and non-tariff barriers to imports, and is assumed to create gains from trade. 
However, gains from trade donot occur when a reduction of import barriers 
doesnot result in a reduction of domestic prices. Up to now, it has simply be 
assumed that domestic prices equal world market prices plus the price effect of 
tariff and non-tariff barriers, and that domestic industry fully responds to this 
price effect, in the sense that domestic production is increased at the expense 
of imports to the point where the marginal private costs of domestic 
production equal the domestic price. However, tariff reduction doesnot lower 
domestic prices in all circumstances. In case an excess margin of protection is 
given, tariff reduction may be inconsequential. Assume a monopoly supplies 
the domestic market. It will maximize profit by expanding production to the 
point where private marginal costs equal marginal revenue. The tariff that is 
optimal from the point of view of the monopoly allows production to expand to 
this point, i.e. it equals the difference between the profit-maximizing price and 
the international supply price. A tariff rate that would exceed the optimal 
tariff rate is redundant and lowering the tariff rate to the level of the optimal 
rate will not have any effect on production and trade. * Second, when the 
distribution of imports is organized by a local producer who controls the 
domestic market, the impact of tariff reduction on domestic prices may be 
limited, particularly in the initial stage of liberalization.^^ Third, tariff 
reduction may be inconsequential when the tariff is "dominated" by a non-
tariff barrier such as a quota that prevents the quantity of imports to 
increase and prices to lower. Also other barriers may prevent tariff reduction 
to have an impact on domestic prices such as quality regulations and 
government procurement policies. Fourth, the price effect of a tariff reduction 
may be relatively small in case the tariff equivalent of transportation costs is 
high. Finally, if foreign supply is less than perfectly elastic, the effect of 
tariff reduction is reduced somewhat by the increased international supply 
price. 
Assume now that tariff reduction does result in a change in domestic prices 
i.e. reduces the excess of domestic prices over international prices. The general 
equilibrium model traditionally used in trade theory analysis suggests an 
instantaneous reaction at the production and consumption side of the economy. 
However, rather than being timeless and smooth, the process of adjustment 
may be time-consuming and costly, particularly so in developing countries. It 
is likely that the process of production contraction in the import-competing 
sector will proceed at a higher speed than the process of production expansion 
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in the export sector. Consequently, during the period of transition the economy 
does not move along the production function but operates at less efficiënt 
points within the production frontier. Some capital and labour in the sector of 
tradables will not be fully employed and the loss of income in these sectors 
will be transmitted to the sector of non-tradables through multiplier effects.33 
Particularly in developing countries the substitutability between import-
competing goods, export goods and non-traded goods will be low. Contraction 
in the import-competing sector does not automatically release resources for the 
expansion of other sectors because of wide differences in product mix, skill 
requirements and machinery.3^ To facilitate the transition, labour has to be 
retrained and investments have to be made in new plants and machinery. The 
less mobile resources are, i.e. the more degenerate the actual production 
function of the economy is, the longer the transition period takes and the 
higher the short-term costs of trade liberalization are. These transition costs 
are not necessarily an obstacle to liberalization and therefore they are dealt 
with somewhat separately. However, a costly and long transition process may 
evoke resistance and endanger the full implementation of the liberalization 
programme. 
4.2 The gains from trade : trade creation and trade diversion. 
No matter what the economie or non-economic arguments may have been for 
creating a trade preferential system, an obstacle to its development may arise 
when the welfare effects - as conceived in the traditional Vinerian approach-
turn out to be negative. When the welfare effects for the partner countries 
as a group are expected to be negative, this might prevent the system from 
being established at all. Analysis of the conditions that determine the welfare 
effects of a preferential trading system suggests that welfare gains will be 
greater when import demand is price elastic, price differences among partner 
countries are large and the price difference between the partner country and 
the world market is small. Alternatively, the more imports are supplied in the 
pre-integration stage by countries outside the preferential area, and the larger 
the costs advantage the countries have over partner countries, the larger trade 
diversion effects will be. When products are not at all produced by partner 
countries, or when partner countries cannot expand supply adequately, tariff 
preferences donot create trade flows. 
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Tariff preferences are often not granted across-the-board but in a discriminate 
manner. To reduce foreign competition to domestic industry for reasons to be 
discussed later, countries may steer negotiations in a way that confines the 
so-called concessions - tariff preferences to partners - to products for which 
there is only limited domestic demand or hardly any domestic supply. In such 
cases the resulting system will have only very limited trade creation effects.35 
For the reasons mentioned above, preferential trading systems among 
developing countries are often expected to have only little and probably 
negative welfare effects, as measured in terms of trade creation and trade 
diversion.3° 
A prevential trading system may have a positive welfare affect on the group of 
countries as a whole but one or more partner countries may nevertheless 
experience a negative welfare affect. In that case, the prevential system is 
potentially beneficial but some additional instruments are required to prevent 
the loss of welfare or to compensate. More in general it holds that the 
distribution of costs and benefit appears to be a major cause of conflict among 
partner countries. Inadequate provisions for an acceptable distribution of the 
net welfare gains among partners may limit the viability of the overall scheme, 
and may induce countries to erode so-called concessions through the 
application of alternative protective devices such as quality regulations, 
administrative delays, government procurement practices, insurance and 
guarantee requirements, and foreign-exchange regulations. ° The problem may 
be tackled in several ways. First, mechanisms such as tax transfers may be 
created to compensate for undesirable outcomes of market forus. Alternatively, 
temporary concessions such as a free-rider position may be offered to partner 
countries to avoid undesired outcomes. Also, a country's potential to gain from 
trade may be enhanced by subsidized investments. Finally, to avoid the problem 
of an undesired distribution of gains and losses, membership of the 
preferential trading system could be limited to countries at a comparable level 
of industrial development and international competitiveness. ^ Elkan suggests 
that an undesirable distribution of net benefits of economie integration, so-
called backwash effects, should be prevented rather than compensated. However 
since there is no perfect knowledge and foresight with respect to the response 
at the demand and supply sides to a tariff reduction, the size of the effects is 
hard to determine, left alone to agree about among governments of partner 
countries. 
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The gains from trade: industrial expansion 
In the previous section the effects of integration have been discussed in 
terms of trade creation and trade diversion as suggested by the Vinerian 
approach. However, the Cooper-Massell approach as well as Johnson's analysis 
of the rationale of economie integration suggest that the effects should not be 
measured in terms of changes in the size of trade flows but in terms of 
changes in manufacturing output. Thus, the distribution among partner 
countries of the costs and benefits of integration should be analyzed in terms 
of the contraction and growth of manufacturing sectors, and changes in the 
location of manufacturing activities. The following analysis of the factors that 
may have a significant impact on the distribution of costs and benefits among 
partner countries is based on the premise that the objective of integration is 
to expand industrial production in the enlarged protected market at reduced 
excess costs. 
To start with, the more similar the degree of preference for industrial 
production beyond the free-trade level, the stronger the basis for a 
preferential trading system. * The effect of integration on production 
expansion is determined by two factors. First, the competitiveness of industry 
vis a vis competitors in partner countries determines the domestic supply 
response to integration. Second, the size of the integrated market as compared 
to the domestic market determines the scope for market expansion. 
Figure 4. Factors affecting the scope for industrial expansion 
negative positive 
competitiveness vis-a-vis weak strong 
partner countries 
relative market size of small large 
partner countries 
As illustrated in Figure 4, the more competitive domestic industry and the 
larger the markets of partner countries as compared to the domestic market, 
the more attractive integration. Thus, participation in a preferential system is 
22 
an attractive option for small countries with a relatively well developed 
industrial sector, the more so if potential partners have a large domestic 
market while their industry is relatively inefficiënt. However, in these partner 
countries liberalization will result in increased import competition while their 
supply response to increased export opportunities is small. Integration may only 
be acceptable to them if proposals for tariff reductions are complemented by 
policies to strengthen the competitiveness of their industry or by compensation 
schemes. More or less comparable levels of industrial development therefore 
appear to be a favorable condition for the creation of a preferential trading 
scheme. The more heterogeneous countries are in terms of industrial 
development, the more compensation schemes and other facilities are 
required.4^ 
A sizeable domestic market may make a large country an attractive partner 
since it creates substantial possibilities for small partners to expand industrial 
production, provided industry in these countries has reached a sufficiënt level 
of competitiveness. Large countries consequently have a strong bargaining 
position in the formation of a preferential trading area. However, small 
countries may face the obstacle that their industry will be outcompeted by the 
industry in the larger partner even if that country's industry is less efficiënt. 
This form of perverse specialization among countries is illustrated in Figure 5. 
The demand curve in the large country is D ^ D ] and in the small country D^^b 
Production in the large and small country is under conditions of economies of 
scale. Industry in the large country is relatively inefficiënt as depicted by the 
position of the supply curves SjD} and S2S^. Nevertheless, production costs at 
the pre-integration stage are lower in the large country due to large-scale 
production. The case of perverse specialization suggests that the large country 
may benefit form integration not only when its industry is efficiënt but also 
when it is not. 
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Figure 5. The case of perverse specialization 
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4.4 The role of domestic interest groups 
In the previous sections we have reviewed conditions that affect the capacity 
of countries to fulfil objectives of economie policy - formulated in an orthodox 
and heterodox way- through the participation in a preferential trading area. 
Thus far the emphasis has been on economie conditions only. Although 
attention has been paid earlier to the role of domestic interest groups in the 
formulation of trade policy and particularly in the erection of import barriers, 
their role in the formation of a preferential trading area, be it supportive or 
obstructive, has not been dealt with. If we were to accept the view that trade 
policy is the outcome of competition among rivaling interest groups, a shift in 
trade policy toward participation in a preferential trading area would reflect a 
change in the effectiveness of interest groups to lobby, or a change in the 
perception of such groups of their interest, or a change in government's 
attitude towards interest groups. Economie theory has become more perceptive 
for the role of non-economic factors in the formulation of the objectives of 
economie policy and the choice of instruments as has been shown earlier. 
However, the economie approach in this area is essentially static and partial, 
and offers little to understand th dynamics of economie policy formulation, 
left alone the reasons for a shift from a unilateral inward-oriented policy 
toward the formation of a preferential trading area. Essentially, both types of 
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government interventions are not optimal and the economie rationale of such 
policies can only be established in the context of market imperfections, the 
preference for a public good, and constraints on the government to use first-
best instruments. The reasons for this preference and the causes of the 
constraints on government behaviour are considered exogenous factors rather 
than objects of analysis. In the context of our study of factors that may 
obstruct the full development of a preferential trading area among developing 
countries, we shall present the findings of some studies that have focused on 
obstacles to regional integration. 
Reviewing some integration efforts among developing countries Vaitswos makes 
the following observations with respect to LAFTA. In the three larger 
countries (Argentina, Brazil and Mexico) there was no significant industrial 
group with an interest in a larger, more competitive regional market. The 
domestic markets were considered sufficiently large and well protected, and 
offered a satisfactory rate of return on investment. Also, industrialists didnot 
favour a common industrial policy and sectoral industrial development 
programmes and prefered a restrained government in this respect. In the 
medium-sized countries (especially Colombia and Chile) industrialists viewed the 
prospects of a relatively open and competitive regional market with skepticism. 
They expected to be outcompeted by industry in the larger and often more 
developed countries. Industrialists favoured a mild form of common industrial 
policy. The smaller and less developed countries (especially Bolivia, Ecuador 
and Paraguay) attempted to obtain some kind of preferential treatment in the 
markets of the larger countries in exchange for opening their markets. From 
this Vaitsos concludes that "... no major local industrial group in LAFTA 
wanted effective trade liberalization", nor were foreign firms operating in the 
region interested in it. * According to Puyana, the industrialists of Argentina, 
Brazil and Mexico, as well as those in Peru, Uruguay and Paraguay were in 
frank opposition to the creation of a Latin American free trade area. The 
limited impact of LAFTA trade flows and industrial development in Latin 
America may be ascribed to industrialists that pressured their governments to 
protect their interests. Tariff concessions "were hegotiated bilaterally and 
productwise, tariff cuts were limited and frequently delayed, and many 
exceptions and company-imposed restrictions on regional transactions were 
made.^ To the extent that trade flows were induced by tariff concessions they 
were "advantageous" for the larger and industrially more advanced partners. 
The frustrations over the unequal distribution of the gains and losses, and the 
unsuccessful negotiations over the second stage of the LAFTA common list lead 
to the creation of the ANDEAN pact in 1969. 
25 
The ANDEAN pact was characterized by a combination of negative and positive 
integration measures. To stimulate a balanced and "harmonious" development, 
tariff reductions were combined with sectoral development programmes, and 
special provisions were made for less developed countries such as Bolivia and 
Ecuador. These two countries were entitled to slower the process of tariff 
reduction.4^ Reviewing the positions of the ANDEAN countries with respect to 
negative and positive integration measures the following observations can be 
made. Chile and Colombia showed a preference for trade liberalization. In this 
combination of countries they supported a comprehensive programme of 
accelerated and automatic tariff reduction. Also, they favoured industrial 
programming in some sectors. Peru and Venezuela favoured the maintenance of 
high tariffs and emphasized the role of industrial development planning. 
Industrialists in Bolivia and Ecuador had a preference for industrial planning 
and opted for minimal tariff reductions. The Venezuelan industrialists seem to 
have rejected both tariff liberalization and industrial planning. 
As compared to the LAFTA initiative, the ANDEAN pact had an ambitious 
programme to stimulate integration. However, the results, as measured in terms 
of overall tariff reduction, (net) trade creation and inducement of industrial 
development were rather limited. With respect to the liberalization of imports, 
three groups of products were distinguished. Tariffs on products not produced 
domestically were to be suppressed completely. Reduction of tariffs on products 
produced in a number of member countries was dependent on the outcome of 
negotiations on the rationalization of production. A programme of automatic 
intra-regional tariff cuts applied to a third group of products. This programme 
aimed at reducing tariffs to a maximum of 100 per cent in 1971, cutting them 
further by 10 per cent annually until 1976 and by 6 per cent annually 
afterwards. Non-tariff barriers, however, were not abolished. ° However, many 
products were removed from the programme for fear of disruption of industrial 
development. Also, countries imposed non-tariff barriers to protect domestic 
industries faced with reduced tariff protection. Finally, negotiations on 
products not included in the automatic tariff-cutting programme were organized 
product-wise. These negotiations proceeded at a disappointingly low speed and 
were frequently delayed. 
The negotiations on a common external tariff did not turn to be successful. 
During the 1970's, a minimum common external tariff was maintained but by 
the mid-1970's, the members stiU had failed to agree upon a common external 
tariff. By 1976 the plan was altogether abandoned and replaced by a proposal 
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for a "tariff band".3" The lack of success in this respect was due to wide 
differenus among countries in the preference for protection. Peru favoured an 
effective rate of protection not higher than 40 per cent although it was 
prepared to accept Colombia's proposal of 60 per cent. Ecuador and Venezuela 
preferred a rate of effective protection not below 80 per cent. This contrasted 
with the position of Chile. This country had been in a process of (unilateral) 
trade liberalization since the end of 1973 and its rates of protection for 
industry were relatively low. By 1975 the Chilean Advisory Committee on 
Tariff Policy made a proposal for a common external tariff with an unweighted 
average rate of effective protection for manufacturing industry of 26 per cent. 
Chile has continued its liberalization effort unilaterally and withdrew from the 
ANDEAN pact in 1976.51 
The experiences of LAFTA and the ANDEAN pact show that an initiative 
towards integration and trade liberalization, if not sufficiently supported by 
domestic industrialists, is unlikely to have a significant economie impact. 
Reviewing the often shortlived and marginal experiments with preferential 
trading systems, the question rises to what extent economie gains are an 
objective of economie integration schemes. According to El-Agraa, nearly all 
such schemes have been established to serve political objectives although the 
arguments frequently have been put forward in terms of potential economie 
gains. ^ A major political objective in this context may be to create closer 
relations between countries. The key factor to success then is a strong 
common preference for political co-operation. However, one might question the 
appropriateness of liberalization as an instrument to serve this political 
objective since liberalization itself tends to create conflicts between 
partners. To serve the purpose of political integration, a slow implementation 
of liberalization measures, selectivity in tariff cuts, a host of compensating 
measures and supporting programmes may be vital, although such measures may 
reduce significantly the economie impact of the liberalization programme. ^ 
The role of multilateral institutions 
So far the making of trade policy has been conceived as the exclusive privilege 
of governments. However, many governments no longer have an exclusive and 
unrestricted monopoly position in the formulation of policy targets and the 
selection of instruments, and they are no longer in a position to choose fully 
independently how to tackle external shocks or to respond to domestic interest 
groups. The room for decision making has become somewhat restricted by 
multilateral institutions such as GATT and particularly the IMF and The World 
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Bank. Therefore some observations are in place regarding the actual role of 
these institutions in the management of balance-of-payments problems and the 
formulation of trade policy. 
During the 197G s and early 1980 s some external shocks had a de-stabilizing 
effect on many developing countries and caused serious balance-of-payments 
problems. Oil price increases, the deterioration of the terms of trade, a 
recession in developed countries, increased protectionism and rising interest 
rates "caused" current account deficits and increased the need for external 
savings. In some developing countries such as Argentina, Mexico and Venezuela 
problems were aggravated by capital flight. A large share of these foreign 
savings were channeled through the international banking system on relaxed 
conditions which enabled countries to postpone somewhat stabilization and 
adjustment policies. However, particularly during the 1980's private banks have 
restricted considerably net sovereign lending to developing countries and new 
loans have only been made available on the condition that countries pursued a 
stabilization and adjustment policy arranged in co-operation with the IMF . At 
this stage, the IMF has become pivotal not only in arranging stabilization and 
adjustment policies in developing countries but also as a supplier of new 
credits. 
The theoretical basis underlying the IMF stabilization and adjustment policies 
is the monetary approach to the balance of payments. Nevertheless, the 
stabilization programmes do not purely reflect a monetarist approach and can 
as well be couched in Keynesian terms.^ The somewhat eclectic nature of the 
IMF approach is reflected by the differences in programmes between countries, 
although all of these programmes have some central features in common such 
as a reduction of total credit expansion, and particularly a reduction of 
government's demand for credits, a reduction of government interventions in 
markets and a liberalization of the exchange control regime. 
In the monetary approach to the balance of payments the external 
disequilibrium of developing countries results form an excess supply of credit. 
In an open economy the excess money supply creates an excess demand for 
goods and services which causes a rise of the prices of non-tradables, an 
uncrease of the volume of imports and a decrease of the volume of exports. 
Control of domestic credit expansion is the single most important an most 
frequently applied instrument in IMF supported programmes. Cutting domestic 
expenditure reduces the gap between domestic absorption and production, and 
restors equilibrium in the current account of the balance of payments. In many 
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programmes measures to reduce domestic expenditure are complemented by 
measures to switch domestic expenditure. Exchange rate adjustment is not 
essential to the monetary approach to the balance of payments but about half 
of all IMF programmes include a devaluation. By shifting the domestic terms of 
trade in favour of tradables, domestic supply of import substitutes and 
exportables is stimulated and domestic demand for tradables is reduced. In a 
situation where quantitative import controls are used, a devaluation may 
absorb part of the rents instead of raising the domestic price of imports. If, 
at the same time, the domestic price of exportables has increased as a 
consequence of devaluation, the domestic terms of trade have changed in 
favour of exportables, thus improving the current account balance. 
In many programmes attempts have been made to substitute tariffs for non-
tariff barriers and reduce the variance of tariff barriers so as to reduce price 
distortions, strengthen the relationship between international and domestic 
prices and increase government revenue at the expense of rent seekers. 
Reduction of the variance of the nominal rate of protection lessens distortions 
at the consumption side, while a reduction in the variance of the effective 
rate of protection reduces distortions at the production side. However, by 
combining reduction of trade barriers with devaluation-so-called compensated 
devaluation- the overall net effective rate of protection for domestic industry 
may remain unaffected. 
Defining now liberalization of the exchange control regime as the reduced 
reliance on quantitative controls as done by Krueger and Bhagwati, it may be 
observed that there has not been a general trend towards liberalization in 
developing countries. ' Killick has shown that even in countries where a series 
of IMF programmes have been pursued, no consistent and significant 
liberalization process has been observable.^ However, particularly during the 
1980's many countries have made, willingly or contre coeur, stand-by 
arrangements with the IMF. At the same time the leverage of the IMF has 
increased. Therefore it seems likely that the impact of the IMF on the design 
of policy has increased and that trade regimes will be liberalized in more and 
more developing countries. 
Independently but not entirely separately front the IMF operates The World 
Bank in the area of trade-policy design in developing countries. The 
programmes of structural adjustment loans and sector adjustment loans, both in 
operation since 1980, aim at strengthening the supply side of the sectors of 
tradables and particularly the export sector. In the area of trade policy the 
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programmes focus on export incentives and improved institutional support, 
adjustment of the exchange rate, tariff reform and the liberalization of the 
exchange control system.^ 
GATT, IMF and The World Bank are three multilateral institutions that 
contribute to the design of liberal trade policy and promote the development 
of an open undiscriminating international trading system. To the extent that 
the liberalization of the trade regime - in the sense of the reduction of 
effective protection against imports - creates trade flows among developing 
countries, a unilateral approach to liberalization stimulates integration among 
developing countries be it in a non-preferential way. However, at the same 
time a unilateral reduction of tariffs and non-tariff barriers reduces the scope 
for and rationale of preferential trading areas among developing countries. 
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